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Part Two: Political, Diplomatic and Military Issues
The Power Structure in Vietnam after the Japanese 
Coup De Force and the ?Power Vacuum? in the August 
Revolution
Phạm Hồng Tung?Professor, Institute of Vietnamese Studies and Development Science, 
VNU-Hanoi
1.??Power Vacuum? Theory in the study of the August Revolution in Vietnam  
During the last 25 years, the issue of a ?power vacuum? has been one of the important topics among 
the researchers both in Vietnam and abroad discussing the political process of the August 1945 Revo-
lution. The concept  was suggested by the Norwegian historian Stein Tønnesson in his PhD disserta-
tion and then in his book published in 1991 in Oslo with the title The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945?
Roosevelt, Hồ Chí Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War. In this work, Tønnesson explains the ?power 
vacuum? as follows: ?The power vacuum can be better described as the absence of the French and Al-
lies, the procrastination of the Japanese in maintaining their rule until the coming of the Allies, and 
the impotency of local oﬃcials and their authorities in realizing their own rights.?1
This was the general situation of Indochina as a whole, including Vietnam, and also the general situ-
ation of most Southeast Asian countries (except for the Philippines and Thailand) after the Japanese 
Emperor oﬃcially oﬀered unconditional surrender to the Allied countries on August 15th 1945. By 
then, the former colonial powers (the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in Malaya and Burma, and the 
French in Indochina) had been vanquished or overthrown by the Japanese. Meanwhile the Allied forc-
es had yet to arrive to disarm the Japanese soldiers. The former colonial masters were unable to return. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese forces (if they were intact) were depressed and demoralized. Pro-Japanese 
governments also fell into distress and were unable to maintain order. 
This general situation is called a ?power vacuum? by Tønnesson. According to him, in Vietnam it 
was this factor that helped the Việt Minh to take power easily. Nevertheless, in his study Tønnesson 
states: ?While attributing crucial important to the power vacuum of August 1945 in explaining the Au-
gust Revolution, this book has not argued that the revolution was ?accidental?, ?fortuitous? or happened 
by ?chance,??2 But in his work, he also raises such questions as ?Who brought the Việt Minh to power in 
the August Revolution?? and even claims that ?by creating the power vacuum the great powers pulled 
1 Stein Tønnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945?Roosevelt, Hồ Chí Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War (Oslo: PRIO, 
1991), p. 6
2 Ibid., p. 412.   
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the carpet out from under the existing state and thus ?invited? the Việt Minh to capture power.?3
In fact, Stein Tønnesson is not the first scholar to suggest the idea of a ?power vacuum? in the con-
text of the August Revolution in Vietnam. Before him, such scholars as Wiiliam. J. Duiker, Huỳnh Kim 
Khánh, Vũ Ngự Chiêu and King C. Chen referred to a similar idea. Duiker was the first to conceptual-
ize the existence of a ?political vacuum.? He wrote:
The August Revolution was so obviously an extraordinary achievement that it is important to 
keep in mind that a number of fortuitous circumstance contributed in no small measure to the 
Communist victory. The rapid disintegration of government authority in both urban and rural ar-
eas, coupled with the delayed arrival of Allied occupation forces after surrender of Japan, created a 
political vacuum at levers of power...4
Although recognizing the existence of a ?political vacuum? and favorable ?fortuitous circumstances? 
of the August Revolution, Duiker resolutely and clearly stated:
Yet the objective conditions alone do not make a revolution, and it is to the credit of the Com-
munists that they were able to grasp the opportunity so enticingly oﬀered at the end of the Pacific 
War. In other colonial societies, the vacuum might have been filled by non-Communist national-
ism. But in Vietnam, the nationalists were unable to rise to the challenge [...] Only the ICP pos-
sessed the sense of timing and the understanding of the strategic nuances of the situation to rise to 
the occasion. The final point is crucial.?5
In his work published in 1982, Huỳnh Kim Khánh also mentioned the ?political vacuum? that ac-
cording to him occurred right after the Japanese coup de force. Based on a thorough analysis of the role 
of subjective and objective factors, he remarked: ?In retrospect, historical fortuitous and revolutionary 
ability played equally important roles in the victory of the Vietnamese Communism.?6 Even Vũ Ngự 
Chiêu, an Overseas Vietnamese scholar who openly questions the role of the Indochinese Communist 
Party (ICP) and the Việt Minh in the August Revolution, had to admit: ?The Việt Minh?s triumph in 
August 1945 was a phenomenon in which both ?favorable situation? and the ICP?s leader?s ability to ex-
ploit these favorable factors were decisive.?7
Thus, a number of scholars in the West have introduced the idea of a ?political vacuum? in Vietnam, 
especially after the Japanese surrender. According to them, this vacuum was accidentally created due 
3 Ibid., pp. 355, 415.
4 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 100. 
5 Ibid., pp. 100?101.
6 Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925?1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 334.
7 Vu Ngu Chieu, ?Political and Social Change in Vietnam between 1940?1946? (Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin/
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to the combination and interaction of some objective factors, and their result was a favorable context 
for the victory of the Việt Minh. However, almost all of these scholars, after having made thorough and 
in-depth analyses of the actual political developments in Vietnam, have agreed on the importance of 
both subjective and objective factors. The most decisive subjective factor was the role and leadership 
played by the ICP. 
2.?Did a ?Political Vacuum? Really Exist?
So what does ?power vacuum? really mean? Is it possible to confirm  that there was such a ?vacuum? 
in Vietnam from August 15 to September 2, 1945? According to Tønnesson, ?power? here refers to 
only the ruling power. Thus, ?power vacuum? merely implies the absence of a ruling power. Even this 
interpretation, however, is not suﬃcient to describe the historical reality of Vietnam of that time. At 
this point, although the power of the French colonialists had been eliminated by the Japanese on 
March 9, 1945, as the Allied forces had not stepped in to demilitarize the Japanese, the structure of 
government in Vietnam was still dominated by two forces, namely the Japanese army and the Trần 
Trọng Kim Cabinet. 
Regarding the Japanese army, although the Emperor?s declaration of surrender made them pro-
foundly demoralized and uprooted, they were far from completely disrupted, weakened or neutralized. 
At that time, the number of fully-armed troops exceeded 90,000 and they were well-known for having 
never lost any battle since the war had begun. Although mentally in crisis, the Japanese armed forces 
were nevertheless well disciplined and did not give up their position as the ruling power. There is clear 
evidence for this point:
- After the Japanese Emperor had surrendered, in the face of a possible overthrow of the Cabinet of 
Trần Trọng Kim and Emperor Bảo Đại by the revolutionary forces, the Japanese still made them 
an oﬀer: ?The Japanese army are still responsible for maintaining the order until the Allies come 
and replace us? and if the Vietnamese government openly asks for our favor, the Japanese army 
shall take up their job.? However, the situation was so hopeless that Bảo Đại and Kim rejected this 
proposal.8
- In Thái Nguyên, on August 16th 1945, the National Liberation Committee deployed their best 
troops to make a joint-attack against the Japanese with the support of the OSS ?Deer Team? (Of-
fice of Strategic Services) led by Allison Thomas. However, after several days the Japanese army 
had not been wiped out or defeated. Only after the revolution had gained victory in Hanoi and the 
Japanese army in Thái Nguyên was ordered to cease their fighting did they accept to negotiate and 
transfer power to the revolutionary forces.
- In Hanoi, during the General Uprising to seize power, the Japanese refused to surrender the Bank 
8 Trần Trọng Kim, Một cơn gió bụi (Sàigòn: Vinh Sơn, 1969), pp. 93?94. See also David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for 
Power (Berkeley: University of California Press 1995). 
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of Indochina. The revolutionary forces were unable to take control of this bank so they had to ne-
gotiate and cooperate with the Japanese to guard it. Meanwhile, the attack on the Security Bar-
racks met great diﬃculty and had to be delayed as the Japanese sent their tanks to intervene. It 
was not until the leadership of the Revolutionary Military Committee successfully negotiated with 
them and the tanks were ordered to withdraw, that the attack succeeded.9
These events prove that the Imperial army consisting of more than 90,000 regular troops in Vietnam 
at that time was still a formidable power, thus there was no ?power vacuum? as proposed by Stein Tøn-
nnesson.
Having been aware of the situation, during its leadership of the uprising to seize power in most 
provinces, especially in large cities, the Việt Minh focused most of its eﬀorts on how to neutralize the 
Japanese and prevent their intervention. In Hanoi, Saigon and many other areas, leaders of the ICP 
and the Việt Minh successfully carried on their brave, creative and skillful negotiations with the local 
Japanese military leadership and successfully neutralized those forces. The overthrow of the govern-
ment was thus quick and calm, without bloody conflicts. 
This diplomatic struggle of the Việt Minh should be seen as a form of power struggle and part of the 
General Uprising to seize power, greatly contributing to the success of the August Revolution. Of 
course, no one could have negotiated with empty hands. The Party and the Việt Minh were able to suc-
ceed in this eﬀort thanks to the strong and massive support of the revolutionary forces that the Party 
had been consistently developing since the 1930s, especially since the formation of the Việt Minh in 
May 1941. It should be noted that in the latter half of August 1945, the Việt Minh were not the only 
force trying to seize the power given other powers who also wanted to seize this opportunity to leave 
their mark, including pro-Japanese forces such as the Phục quốc, the Cao Đài and the Đại Việt Quốc 
gia Liên minh. All these forces also tried to persuade the Japanese army to give them power and weap-
ons. So, why did the Japanese not choose them, but decide to negotiate only with the Việt Minh? The 
Kempeitai were certainly not naïve or blind. They understood clearly that only the Việt Minh had the 
upper hand, being backed up by massive popular support. This was the main reason why the diplomat-
ic eﬀort by Việt Minh was successful. 
The second existing power in Vietnam after the Japanese Emperor conceded was the Trần Trọng 
Kim Cabinet. It was widely known that this government was vulnerable, decayed and deeply in crisis 
following the Japanese surrender. However, as a part of the ruling power structure at that moment, this 
government did not voluntarily give up its ruling position In Hanoi, on August 17, the Federation of 
Civil Servants even held a meeting to support the Kim government. Thanks to its creative plan and 
timing, the Revolutionary Military Committee managed to mobilize the masses to this meeting, took it 
over and transformed it into a massive parade to endorse the Việt Minh. Yet the next day, as a repre-
9 Lê Trọng Nghĩa, ?Các Ủy ban nhân dân cách mạng ra mắt ở Hà Nội sau Khởi nghĩa Cách mạng tháng Tám,? in 19-8: Cách 
mạng là sáng tạo (Hà Nội: Hội Khoa học Lịch sử Việt Nam, 1995), pp. 87?94.
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sentative of the Kim Cabinet, Minister Hoàng Xuân Hãn came to 101 Gambetta (now Trần Hưng Đạo 
Street) to try and persuade the representative of the Committee to delay the revolution, arguing that 
the Việt Minh should ?take control of rural areas, while our Government continues to manage the big 
cities so that we have legitimacy to talk with the Allies??10 At the same time, on August 21, when the 
nationwide liberation movement led by the Việt Minh was in full swing, the National United Front?
an association of pro-Japanese organizations and sects in Cochinchina, held a formal meeting in Sai-
gon with the participation of half a million people to celebrate the return of Cochinchina to Vietnam, 
but its main purpose was to support Kim and welcome the newly appointed governor Nguyễn Văn 
Sâm. 
It could be said that this pro-Japanese puppet government was not completely paralyzed even 
though significantly weakened. During the General Uprising, any mistake might have caused heavy 
losses for the revolutionary forces. The betrayal and persistent disobedience of Quan Dương in Hà 
Đông which led to 47 deaths was the most typical example.
It is obvious that the General Uprising of Vietnamese people under the leadership of the Party and 
the Việt Minh in the Fall of 1945 occurred in favorable conditions, but it surely did not result from a 
?power vacuum.? Existing powers, including the Japanese army and the governmental system led by 
the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet, to some extent supported by a number of pro-Japanese parties, were able 
not only to hold on their control but even respond with powerful strikes to prevent the Việt Minh 
from seizing the power. Thanks to the enormous support of the masses and their commitment and 
strategies, the Party and the Việt Minh made their move at the right moment and successfully led the 
nationwide General Uprising. 
3.?The Power Vacuum Theory Reinterpreted
It is necessary to look at Tønnesson?s concept of ?power vacuum? from a diﬀerent angle. Socio-polit-
ical power, according to Max Weber, is ?a chance for people to impose their will, regardless of any op-
position.?11 Political power is therefore not always in the hands of the rulers but can be shared with or 
shifted to oppositional forces. In reality, in Vietnam from September 1940 to September 1945 there 
were important divisions and shifts of political power. Before September 1940, supreme power was 
held by the French colonial regime. After the Japanese army moved in Indochina and Vietnam, the 
French had to share and transfer part of their political power to them. The Japanese can even be said to 
have held supreme power in Indochina. On March 9, 1945, the Japanese overthrew the French, becom-
ing the absolute and most important holder of political power. To stabilize their domination, they had 
to share part of the power with Trần Trọng Kim?s Cabinet. 
In that very context, however, new powers came into being and began to get involved in the battle at 
diﬀerent levels and scales. They were nationalist and patriotic movements, of which the Việt Minh led 
10 Ibid.
11 See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972), p. 28. 
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by the Indochinese Communist Party was the most formidable, received the greatest support of the 
masses, and possessed the biggest organizational structure in terms of scale and scope in both rural 
and urban areas. More importantly, after March 9th, this force managed to obtain political control in 
various areas thanks to their gradual eﬀorts. In early June, the Liberation Zone was oﬃcially estab-
lished with its headquarters in Tân Trào. The Việt Minh forces continued to develop rapidly, and by the 
day the Japanese Emperor surrendered, had already become one of the most powerful forces in Viet-
nam. 
This political reality was well recognized by the two ruling powers at that time, namely the Japanese 
army and Emperor Bảo Đại as well as the Kim Cabinet. Therefore, these powers had to abide and 
transfer their power to the Việt Minh. This power transfer was conducted through symbolic yet im-
portant and resolute actions, one of which was the August 19 commitment by General Tsuchihashi to 
stay neutral and nonaligned. This was later confirmed by a telegram sent by the Japanese Ambassador 
back to Tokyo: ?On the 19th, the Ambassador was ?invited? to the meeting with the Etsumei?s [Việt 
Minh] leaders and had a talk with them as they were considered oﬃcial authorities.?12 In Saigon, the 
power transfer was marked by an important though symbolic action: the declaration on August 23rd 
by Marshal Terauchi before Trần Văn Giàu and Phạm Ngọc Thạch?senior representatives of the Việt 
Minh?on the non-interventionist stance of the Japanese in the event that the Việt Minh took power. 
He even oﬀered his personal sword and gun to the Việt Minh representatives as a pledge.13 In Huế, the 
symbol of power transfer was the Declaration of abdication by Bảo Đại (August 25th 1945) and his giv-
ing of the sword and royal seal to representatives of the Provisional Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam at the Ngọ Môn (Imperial Citadel) on August 30.
The Independence meeting in which President Hồ Chí Minh pronounced his Declaration dated Sep-
tember 2, 1945 marked the end of the transition between existing powers in Vietnam after the August 
Revolution:
?The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, and Emperor Bảo Đại has abdicated. Our 
people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and replaced it with 
an independent Vietnam. Our people at the same time have overthrown the monarchic regime 
that has reigned supreme for dozens of centuries and replaced it with the present Democratic Re-
public.?14
An approach to Vietnamese history from September 1940 to September 1945 from the perspective 
of political science helps to confirm that in reality there was no ?power vacuum? in Vietnam during the 
12 Lê Trọng Nghĩa, ?Các Ủy ban nhân dân cách mạng,? p. 94.
13 Marr, Vietnam 1945, p. 458. According to the (unpublished) memoir of Tran Van Giau, only Phạm Ngọc Thạch was sent to 
meet Terauchi and he was given a sword and a gun by him to secure his promise. 
14 Hồ Chí Minh, Toàn Tập (Hà Nội: Chính trị Quốc gia, 2000), p. 557.
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General Uprising that was part of the August Revolution. 
Conclusion 
The concept ?political vacuum? or ?power vacuum? proposed by Stein Tønnesson and other Western 
scholars is merely a form of description of the overall situation in Vietnam after the Japanese coup and 
the particularly favorable context for Vietnamese people to ?use their own strength? to liberate Viet-
nam through the General Uprising, given that the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies. It would be 
totally incorrect to consider it a decisive factor that led to the victory of the August Revolution. Two 
things can be added to illustrate this point:
First, it should be noted that the opportune moment for a take-over of power resulted from the in-
teraction between subjective and objective factors. Objective and exogenous factors alone were not 
enough to produce such an opportunity. Moreover, however fruitful this opportunity was, had the rev-
olutionary forces been too indecisive, it would have passed and become useless. Suppose that there had 
been such a ?power vacuum? as described by Tønnesson, this ?vacuum? would have opened an oppor-
tune moment for all three nations in Indochina?Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Yet only in Vietnam 
did a revolution involving millions of people occur, while in Cambodia and Laos there was no such 
development. It can thus be argued that it was endogenous factors along with exogenous factors that 
played a decisive role in the launching and victory of the August Revolution. 
Second, during the period from the Japanese coup to mid-August 1945, not only the ICP and the 
Việt Minh but also Vietnam Nationalist Party and dozens of other parties and religious sects such as 
the Cao Đài and Hoà Hảo joined in the heated quest for power. The objective conditions (which the 
Western scholars have called ?power vacuum?) provided the opportunities for not only the Việt Minh 
but also the other forces. But in reality, no political forces other than the Việt Minh could seize these 
opportunities, with some exceptional cases where some members of the Vietnam Nationalist Party and 
other organizations under the umbrella of Chiang Kai-shek?s army could manage to occupy some local 
areas in Tonkin for a rather short time. This fact proves that only the Việt Minh and the ICP-led orga-
nizations grasped the timing and thus were able to gain the final victory.
